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Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts L.L.C., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (Mar. 27, 2014)1 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined three issues: (1) whether precedential uniformity requires a 
reinstatement of appeals; (2) whether failure to follow court rules is grounds for dismissing a 
civil appeal; and (3) whether failure to serve each attorney with a motion to dismiss is grounds 
for en banc reconsideration. 
 
Disposition 
  
 Precedential uniformity does not require a reinstatement of appeals in order to decide a 
case on the merits.  Therefore, failure to follow court rules is grounds for dismissing a civil 
appeal.  Additionally, failure to serve each attorney with a motion to dismiss is not grounds for 
reconsideration.    
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
 Two appeals, one challenging the judgment of a district court in a real property contract 
action and one challenging the same district court’s post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees 
and costs, were consolidated on December 12, 2012.  Appellants’ opening brief was due on or 
before March 12, 2013.   
  
Overdue Opening Brief 
 Appellants’ counsel repeatedly failed to file the opening brief after several extended 
deadlines. After receiving one extension, Appellants’ counsel sought a second, but still did not 
submit the brief by their proposed deadline.   The Court denied the extension as moot, but  
granted appellants some ten additional days to file and serve the opening brief and appendix.  
The order warned that failure to file the brief by this new deadline could result in the appeals’ 
dismissal.  However, Appellants failed to do so.  Appellants had two attorneys throughout the 
appeals process, Mr. Sterling and Mr. Collier.  Mr. Sterling was responsible for filing documents 
with the Court and briefing the appeal.  Mr. Collier was trial counsel, and received copies of the 
court’s orders and notices. 
  
Motion to Dismiss 
 After the Court’s final deadline passed, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss.  
Appellants, by way of Mr. Sterling, filed an opposition and asked the Court for more time to file 
the brief, until June 12, noting to the court that deadlines on a number of urgent matters had all 
fell due around the same time.  However, the Court was unpersuaded by Appellants’ plight and 
granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, based on appellants’ failure to file the brief and 
appendix by the final deadline, and because of appellants’ failure to comply with court rules and 
directives. 
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Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Rehearing 
  Appellants retained new counsel and filed a petition for rehearing to reinstate their 
appeals and a motion for reconsideration.  Appellants argued they were unaware of Mr. 
Sterling’s pattern of brushing-off the Court’s orders.  Furthermore, appellants relied on the 
Court’s policy of favoring merit-based consideration of appeals.  Additionally, appellants 
claimed that both Mr. Sterling and respondents’ counsel failed to notify Mr. Collier about the 
motion to dismiss, preventing Mr. Collier from rectifying the situation. 
 Respondents opposed both the rehearing petition and the motion, and argued that Mr. 
Collier knew of the deadlines and was served the Court’s orders and notices warning of possible 
dismissal for failing to file documents.  Additionally, respondents argued that Mr. Collier should 
have known the appeals weren’t being handled properly because he never received a copy of the 
opening brief from Mr. Sterling before the deadline expired.  Furthermore, respondents stated 
that Mr. Sterling contacted Mr. Collier on June 4, asking for copies of the transcripts.  Because 
the transcripts were necessary in preparing the brief, respondents claimed that this contact should 
have alerted Mr. Collier that the brief wasn’t ready in time.  Finally, respondents argued that 
even though Mr. Collier was not served the motion to dismiss, he was aware that dismissal could 
be imminent because he received the Court’s order containing the final deadline, afterwhich the 
Court could have dismissed the appeals sua sponte.   
Unfortunately for Appellants, the petition for rehearing and the motion for 
reconsideration were both denied . This petition for en banc reconsideration followed. 
 
Discussion 
 Appellants’ petition to reinstate their case focused on two reasons. First, appellants 
asserted the principle of uniformity required reinstatement in order to preserve a public policy 
favoring a decision on the merits.  Second, appellants contended that dismissal was improper 
because Mr. Collier never received service of either the motion to dismiss or Mr. Sterling’s 
motions for extensions of time. 
 The Court began its analysis noting that en banc consideration is “disfavored,” and proper 
only to “preserve precedential uniformity” or when involving important constitutional or public 
policy issues.2 The Court found, however, that Appellants case did not meet these requirements.  
 
Precedential uniformity does not mandate reinstatement of these appeals 
 To support their uniformity argument, appellants cited to Hansen v. Universal Health 
Servs. of Nevada, Inc.,3 where the Court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss because: (1) the 
compelling nature of the facts; (2) the Court’s preference for deciding cases on the merits; and 
(3) because the dilatory conduct was committed solely by counsel’s inexcusable neglect, and not 
by the client.4 
 However, the Court took this opportunity to overrule the “compelling nature” and 
“dilatory conduct . . . by counsel” components in Hansen. The Court rejected Hansen’s 
compelling nature component, noting the opinion d[id] not provide any reasoning or legal basis 
for the conclusion that compelling facts may preclude dismissal.” Next, the Court rejected 
Hansen’s dilatory conduct provision, stating it was inconsistent with general agency principles. 5 
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Finally, the Court affirmed the public policy favoring decision on the merits over dismissal, but 
observed it was not a panacea stating “dismissal of an appeal after a party fails to comply with 
court rules and orders is not inconsistent with the policy preference to decide cases on the merits 
when balanced with other policy concerns.” 
 
Failure to follow court rules as grounds for dismissing civil appeal    
 First, the Court cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Link that when an action is 
dismissed because a party fails to follow court rules, the party cannot seek a do-over claiming 
that dismissal is too harsh a penalty for counsel’s actions, because that would offend general 
agency principles. 6   Here, the Court noted that appellants failed to follow rules governing 
briefing and motions practice, disregarded the briefing deadlines, and provided no adequate 
reason for doing so.  The Court further stated that appellants cannot expect the Court to consider 
the merits of the appeals whenever appellants decide to submit their brief.  The Court also stated 
that appellants were warned in the My 24 order that dismissal may be forthcoming if the brief 
was not filed on time.  Therefore, the Court stated, the dismissal should not come as a surprise.  
The Court also noted that this outcome is consistent with federal authority and with general 
agency principles. 
 
Respondents’ failure to serve appellants’ second attorney with their motion to dismiss is not 
grounds for reconsideration      
 The Court rejected appellants’ argument that neglecting to serve Mr. Collier constituted a 
Due Process violation.  The Court noted that appellants freely chose their counsel, and counsel 
was served with all documents in the matter.  Further, the Court stated that both attorneys of 
record for the appellants received the May 24 order and therefore both should have been aware 
of the briefing deadlines.  The Court then states that NRPC 5(b)7 requires that service be made 
upon the attorney in the singular.  The Court interpreted this to mean that only one attorney 
representing a party needs to be served with a document in order to receive notice of the 
document.  Because Mr. Sterling was served with the motion to dismiss, and because Mr. 
Sterling and Mr. Collier were both served with the May 24 order, respondents’ failure to serve 
Mr. Collier with the motion to dismiss does not provide a basis for en banc reconsideration.   
 
Conclusion 
  
Precedential uniformity does not require a reinstatement of appeals.  Furthermore, failure to 
follow court rules is grounds for dismissing a civil appeal.  Additionally, failure to serve each 
attorney representing a party with a motion to dismiss is not grounds for en banc reconsideration.  
Therefore, the Court denied appellants’ reinstatement of appeals.  Further, the Court denied en 
banc reconsideration.  
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